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SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON DECOLONIZATION CONDEMNS LINKS BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND CERTAIN WESTERN COUNTRIES; HEARS TWENTY PETITIONERS ON EAST TIMOR

The Special Committee on decolonization in a six-hour meeting this evening, concluded a two-week session by condemning the extensive links and collaboration between the apartheid regime of South Africa and certain Western countries, especially the United States and Israel, in the political, diplomatic, economic, nuclear, military and other fields.

It took that action as it adopted a report of its Sub-Committee on Petitions, Information and Assistance concerning the implementation of the Declaration on decolonization. In adopting the report, the Committee also deplored the granting of a credit of $1.1 billion to South Africa in November 1982 by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and regretted that IMF continued to maintain links with South Africa.

Statements regarding the report were made by the representatives of Sweden, Chile, Fiji, Trinidad and Tobago, and Côte d'Ivoire.

A representative of the World Bank, David Loos, also made a statement.

Also at the final meeting, 20 petitioners addressed the Committee on the question of East Timor, as the Committee concluded hearings on the item. The representatives of Sweden, Indonesia and Portugal made statements in that regard.

The petitioners addressing the meeting were: Benedict R. Anderson, South-East Asia Program, Cornell University; Soei Liong Liem, British Campaign for the Defence of Political Prisoners and Human Rights in Indonesia; Julia Morrigan, Indonesia East Timor Program; Sidney Jones, Amnesty International; Klemens Ludwig, Society for Threatened Peoples; Jan Muter, Komitee Indonesie; Robert Archer, Catholic Institute for International Relations; Lord Avebury, Parliamentary Human Rights Group; Michel Robert, Association de Solidarite avec Timor Oriental; Masaki Yokoyama, Christian Conference of Asia; Matthew Francis, Hobart East Timor Committee; Elizabeth Traube, Wesleyan University; William F. Felice, International League for the Rights and Liberation of Peoples; Francisco Fernandez, de la Comunidad de Refugiados del Timor Oriental residentes en Australia; Pat Walsh, Australia Council for Overseas Aid; Jose Ramos Horta; Elaine Briere, Canada Asia Working Group; Luisa Teotonio Pereira, Comissao Para os Direitos do povo Maubere; Monseñor Martinho da Costa Lopes; and Floyd Abrams, Asia Watch.

Finally, the Special Committee decided to continue consideration of the agenda item on the Gibraltar at its meeting next year.

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Question of East Timor

The Special Committee on decolonization met this afternoon to resume its consideration of the question of East Timor and take up its agenda item on Gibraltar.

The first speaker, TOKO DIAKENGA SERAO (Angola), said the question of East Timor flowed from the decolonization process. One country had departed and another had taken its place. Nothing could justify Indonesia's militaristic conduct. The question concerned the right of those people to self-determination. In terms of human tragedy, the situation required immediate action from the international community. For that reason, he had always fully supported any measures designed to lead to negotiation between the parties involved.

He said his position on East Timor was taken on the act of occupation and was not directed towards the people of Indonesia. International law called on all States to refrain from such aggressive occupation. He appealed to Indonesia to reverse its course and he reaffirmed his solidarity with the people of East Timor in their struggle to regain their rights.

The Committee then resumed its hearings on the item.

The first speaker, BENEDICT R.O.G. ANDERSON, of the South-East Asia Programme of Cornell University, said most of the information about East Timor came from the Suharto regime itself. "If officials of this regime concede the deaths of at least 15 per cent of the East Timorese population of 1975; the existence of thousands of orphans, abandoned children, as well as maimed and crippled people; overwhelming illiteracy; massive non-use of the Indonesian language; severe economic backwardness; a pervasive climate of fear and suspicion; strengthened guerrilla resistance; and the continuing need to isolate East Timor even from Indonesians -- then we can be confident that, after 11 years of brutal military occupation, the so-called pacification has failed, not to speak of integration", he said.

Recalling the Indonesian independence, he said it had happened partly because Indonesian freedom-fighters had continued their resistance in the rural areas, just as East Timorese freedom-fighters were doing today. It had also happened because the United Nations had had the courage and energy to make its presence felt, and to bring to bear the weight of world opinion. In addition, the allies of the Netherlands, most notably the United States, had also made clear that they could no longer support Dutch policies.

There was no genuine connection between Indonesian nationalism and East Timor, he continued. Only two small groups in Indonesia had a real interest in the occupation. One was a clique of officials and businessmen who had made great profits from monopoly control of East Timor's superb export coffee, and hoped to do still better from the oil reputed to lie beneath its surrounding waters. The other was a not much larger group of senior military officers who had devised and carried out the occupation, built their careers on it, and for reasons of face and power, could not bear to contemplate its abandonment.

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Those two small groups controlled Indonesian public life, but did not represent the Indonesian people, he said. Nor would they be around forever. There was no reason why the nations of Indonesia and East Timor could not live side by side in amity, he said.

"The people of East Timor have suffered unimaginably for having done no more than claim those rights to self-determination on which the whole organization of the United Nations is based. It is therefore surely only right and proper for the United Nations to do now for East Timor what it did so successfully for Indonesia itself less than 40 years ago", he said.

The United Nations could lend active support to the efforts of Portugal to fulfil its decolonizing responsibilities, and could strongly encourage Indonesia's closest friends to exert their influence and extend their good offices. A key factor in the successful decolonization of Indonesia had been a significant change in the policy of the United States.

The role played by the United States alone in 1949 could today be jointly re-enacted by the United States and Japan, he said. The United States bore the same kind of responsibility for Indonesian aggression in 1975-1986 as it had borne for Dutch aggression in 1946-1949, he concluded.

LIEM SOEI LIONG, speaking on behalf of the British Campaign for the Defence of Political Prisoners and Human Rights in Indonesia, said there were two faces to the Indonesian colonial regime in East Timor. One was the public face, to persuade the world that Indonesia had improved the welfare of the people and that it ruled with their consent. The other was the grim face of military domination, the reality of everyday life that the Timorese were forced to confront.

Indonesia's "27th province" was a military project run by the armed forces, he said. The Territory fell under the responsibility of a special, centralized military command, the Security Operations Command of East Timor, which was in charge of the conduct of the war. The territorial management of East Timor was the responsibility of the Sub-Regional Military Command. It had been estimated that between 10,000 and 15,000 troops were usually present in East Timor. The numbers of sub-regional troops remained fairly constant, for they were engaged primarily in keeping order in the resettlements, where the vast majority of Timorese had been forced to live. The number of special troops brought in as required by the level of war activities, the season and so on, tended to vary from time to time. There was a constant flow of army battalions replacing each other, from different parts of Indonesia, for operational duties. Indeed, virtually all the new generation of officers now installed in the highest eschelons of the Indonesian armed forces were East Timor war veterans, who had won their battle honours fighting against the armed resistance in East Timor and against the defenceless East Timorese living under Indonesian rule.

The "27th province" was not administered as a province at all, but was subject to methods of administration determined by the conduct of war operations and the current level of security "disorders", he said. The network of resettlements, or pemukiman, into which the majority of East

Timorese had been herded were nothing less than concentration camps. Those pemukiman conformed to the army's basic doctrine of territorial management, which required people to live in communities that lended themselves to effective military and bureaucratic control. Resettlement was a feature of social control in many parts of Indonesia, and in East Timor it had been enforced in a particularly vicious and brutal fashion.

Regarding the civil administration, he said the "27th province" was, in effect, run by a bureaucracy composed of senior civil servants brought in from outside, mainly from Java. The normal provincial structure down to village level was almost non-existent, as local administration and other social activities such as education, the information service, the offices of religion and so on, were run largely by the army. At the provincial level, most economic and social programmes, in particular the development activities now being undertaken to "upgrade" East Timor's economy, were in the hands of a bureaucracy controlled by government departments in Jakarta.

One of the ugliest features of Indonesian colonialism was its racism and its contempt for all aspects of Timorese culture, he said. Timorese farming traditions were consistently disparaged as being backward and in need of "improvement" by the adoption of Javanese farming methods. In pursuit of the obliteration of Timor's "inferior" culture and languages, Bahasa Indonesia had been made compulsory in schools and offices, while native languages were being marginalized and eliminated. The superiority of the Indonesian language had been one of the main themes of the tenth anniversary "celebrations". The Portuguese colonialists, in their day, could hardly have formulated more clearly the standard colonial belief in the superiority of their own language and culture.

It was the duty of international bodies like the United Nations to denounce all forms of colonialism in this modern era, he concluded, and to denounce Indonesian colonialism in East Timor. It was the task of the international community to demand the withdrawal of all Indonesian troops from East Timor, opening the way for the Maubere people to freely decide their own future in a genuine act of self-determination, supervised by the United Nations.

JULIA MORRIGAN, of the Indonesia East Timor Program, said that while Indonesia's Foreign Minister, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, had spoken repeatedly about the necessity of ending military occupation when referring to Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea, he defended the "right" of the Indonesian military to invade and occupy East Timorese land.

Most of the population in East Timor lived under desperate conditions in resettlement camps under the hostile eye of the Indoensian military; where their native languages and culture were outlawed; where they were forced -- often at gunpoint -- to follow the Indoensian administration's orders on where to live, to work and to eat; and where they dared not even protest.

The Suharto regime was none too free with details of its development programme in East Timor, but it was obvious that it was being used to strengthen Indonesian control over the Timorese rather than to help them

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prosper, she said. For example, an expensive new radio station had been built -- hardly essential to the health of East Timorese peasants forcibly relocated in malarial lowlands, although it was seen as valuable to a regime which still believed it could win the hearts and minds of an imprisoned people.

Similar motives inspired Indonesian restrictions on outside aid or humanitarian organizations operating in East Timor or on foreign journalists visiting the area, she said. If the Timorese were truly happy and healthy under Indonesian rule, then what did Indonesia fear from opening East Timor to unrestricted international scrutiny? she asked. If a group like Amnesty International was wrong in its heartbreaking documentation of 11 years of human rights violations, then why continue to bar it from East Timor?

Western nations could end the bloodshed immediately if they so chose, she said. They could halt all weapons flow to Indonesia, severing all economic connections with Indonesia, and making aid conditional on an internationally monitored act of self-determination for East Timor. The United Nations and its Member nations had the obligation to use their considerable influence on East Timor's behalf. In particular, under the auspices of the United Nations there had been periodic talks between Portugal and Indonesia in order to decide the fate of the Territory, she said, regretting that the women and men of East Timor had been excluded. She urged that any discussions on East Timor include East Timorese representatives.

SIDNEY JONES, representing Amnesty International, said that since it last presented its concerns to the Committee in August 1985, she had received reports of torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, unfair trials of political prisoners, and severe restrictions throughout the Territory on the rights to freedom of expression, opinion, association and movement. Although there had been few reports of political killings or "disappearances" in the first eight months of 1986, the absence of investigations by the Indonesian authorities for such abuses in the past suggested that those violations were condoned.

In addition, she said she was concerned at the continuing reports of torture inflicted by Indonesian security forces upon suspected supporters of the Revolutionary Front for the Independence of East Timor (FRETILIN). Such toture could take the form of severe beating, electric shocks and, in the case of women, sexual abuse. The risk of torture appeared to be particularly great for people arrested and interrogated by the Indonesian military in district or sub-district military commands outside the capital city of Dili. The Indonesian authorities continued to maintain that there were no political prisoners outside the two major prisons in Dili, but evidence to the contrary was strong.

She said the failure of the Indonesian Government to take firm measures to prohibit torture by its nationals in East Timor raised serious questions about its commitment to uphold the provisions of the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which Indoensia had signed but not yet ratified. In addition, over 800 people had remained detained on Atauro Island without charge or trial, some of them

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for over three years, despite announcements by the Indonesian Government in 1985 that all of the non-native inhabitants of the island would be relocated to the main island by the end of that year.

The 800 who remained on Atauro, she went on, were part of a prisoner population that at its height in 1982 totalled more than 4,000. Many of the prisoners sent back by the Government to the main island were not allowed to return to their own villages, but instead were sent to so-called "resettlement areas", where many faced forced separation from their families or, in some cases, to prison. She was aware of several cases where people had been sent directly from Atauro to the Comarca prison in Dili for trial on political charges, after having been detained without charge or trial for several years.

Amnesty International remained concerned about conditions in many of the resettlement areas to which returnees from Atauro were sent. People sent to those areas appeared to have had no choice in place of settlement, and conditions with respect to food and medicine were reported in some areas to be worse than on Atauro. International organizations did not have access to all of the areas.

Amnesty International was concerned about the fairness of trials conducted in Dili District Court, where, between December 1983 and March 1986, 209 suspected supporters of FRETILIN had been tried and convicted. All but two of the prisoners had been charged with conspiracy to commit rebellion. All of them had pleaded guilty and none had appealed. According to security officers quoted in the Indonesian daily newspaper Sinar Harapan, that was because the evidence against them had been strong and most of the accused had been caught in the act. No information had been made available on the background of the arrest. Amnesty International was concerned that the prisoners might not have been apprised of their right not to be compelled to testify against themselves or confess guilt, and that they might have been pressured into pleading guilty.

The Indonesian Government had not allowed qualified international observers to attend the trials and Amnesty's International request to send observers had been turned down by the Indonesian Government. In view of its concerns, and without the presence of international observers or the provision of documents, Amnesty International could not accept assurances from the Indonesian Government that the trials were fair.

In response to allegations of human rights violations by the Indonesian military in East Timor, the Indonesian Government had referred to economic development, had noted abuses committed by the Portuguese, and had questioned the reliability, accuracy and impartiality of the information on which those allegations were based. Concluding, she said the international community must insist that immediate measures be taken to ensure that the fundamental human rights of the East Timorese were respected.

KLEMENS LUDWIG, speaking on behalf of the Society for Threatened Peoples, said East Timor, according to international law, remained a Territory in which the process of decolonization had not been finished. Western European countries spoke out in favour of the right of self-determination in the

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Territories where the process of decolonization had not yet been finished. Accordingly, decolonization in East Timor, in conformity with international law and the free choice of the people, should be one of the main concerns of Western European and the Federal Republic of Germany's foreign policy. Yet, the Federal Republic of Germany was one of the main supporters of the so-called decolonization process carried out by Indonesia.

For East Timor, that close co-operation meant that the Federal Republic of Germany, as well as most of the other Western European countries, abstained on all Timor votes of the General Assembly, instead of supporting the right of self-determination. Outside the General Assembly, the Federal German Government was one of the most outspoken opponents of the decolonization process in East Timor. It also denied the consequences of the Indonesian kind of decolonization: war, famine and human rights violations.

In February 1984 a parliamentary delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany visited East Timor, he said. They published a balanced report, stressing progress as well as oppression.

When the Defence Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany visited Indonesia in November 1985, 87 Social Democratic and 20 Green Members of Parliament urged him to raise the East Timor issue, he said. But he refused. Such callous disregard for the tragedy suffered by the East Timorese since the Indonesian invasion was the hallmark of official declarations by the Federal Republic of Germany.

The Federal Republic of Germany's policy was guided by economic and military interests, he continued. The Federal Republic of Germany regarded Indonesia as a major partner in the arms trade and in private investment. According to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, by April 1984, the Federal Republic of Germany had become, after the United States, the second largest supplier of military equipment to Indonesia. Indonesia was not devoting much attention and resources to building its own armaments industry, and looked to West Germany for support.

In addition, the Federal Republic of Germany was also supporting the nuclear research centre in Serpong, south-west of Jakarta, where a multipurpose nuclear reactor was being built. The reactor was producing low-concentrate uranium, suitable for use in the manufacture of nuclear weapons.

PAT WALSH, of the Australian Council for Overseas Aid, said nothing had happened since 1975-1976 to legitimize Indonesia's forced incorporation of East Timor or to cancel the right of the East Timorese people to self-determination. The passage of time, the heavy weight of Indonesia's presence, or changes in the material circumstances should not be permitted to obscure the central fact that Indonesia's occupation remained illegal and that the East Timorese had been cynically denied any opportunity to decide their own future. The United Nations had a clear moral obligation to keep the issue on its agenda and to persist with the question regardless of other factors.

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He was alarmed to hear suggestions that the United Nations was considering observing the Indonesian general elections in East Timor next year. A United Nations visit to East Timor for that purpose would be a highly political exercise. In the circumstances of a general election it could only be interpreted as tacit acceptance by the United Nations that East Timor was part of Indonesia.

The United Nations would be the object of international ridicule were it now to identify itself in any way with Indonesian-style elections in occupied East Timor, he went on. He urged the United Nations to have nothing to do with any suggestion of monitoring the 1987 Indonesian general elections in East Timor.

Indonesian integration strategy in East Timor up to 1979 had concentrated on major military operations aimed at gaining control of the population. Indonesian strategy since then had been more a "hearts and minds" strategy accompanied by periodic military campaigns inevitably involving persistent and often gross human rights abuses. Large sums had been spent on housing and schools in the "resettlement villages" and on infrastructure, including administrative buildings, communications and roads enabling Indonesia to claim greater advances for East Timor under its administration than under Portugal.

While that approach had earned Indonesia considerable kudos in some quarters of the international community, it should be seen in its proper perspective as an integral part of Indonesia's attempts to consolidate its presence and Indonesianise the Territory and its people.

He was convinced that long-term conflict was inevitable in East Timor unless there was a radical change in approach. Ten years had amply demonstrated that the solution did not lie in military, political or cultural violence but in respect for fundamental rights of which the United Nations was the international guardian.

JOSE RAMOS-HORTA, representative of FRETILIN at the United Nations, said that the Committee had before it a working paper prepared by the Secretariat. The authors of the working paper tried to present a "balanced" picture of the situation in the Territory, and ended up balancing facts and fiction. The fiction was the product of a relentless campaign by the Government of Indonesia to persuade the world that it had done wonders for the people of East Timor. The facts of Indonesia's continuing military occupation, the continuing brutal war it waged against the people and the denial of the East Timorese people's right to self-determination had been carefully avoided.

The Indonesian propaganda machine, he said, aided and abetted by its American, Australian, Canadian, Japanese and European trading partners, said the real question in East Timor was what else the Indonesian authorities should be doing for the improvement of the lot of the people of the Territory. Indonesia's illegal occupation, its continuing savage war against the resistance fighters and its defiance of Security Council resolutions were no longer discussed.

For instance, he said, the working paper prepared by the Secretariat quoted a certain Swedish diplomat, a Mr. Klackenberg, who said the resistance had been crushed. For all intent and purposes, the East Timorese people's right to self-determination was no longer an issue, nor were basic individual human rights, since, according to him, he did not see any political persecution.

He said the visit to East Timor by Mr. Klackenberg was a typical case, in that Western Governments with close association with Indonesia were not really interested in finding out the truth of the situation in East Timor. Their motivation was simply to better defend an established policy. The tragedy was that to defend such a morally bankrupt policy, they were forced to cover up the ugly truth. In the process, they contributed to the suffering and death of thousands of people who could have been saved if the true extent of the tragedy were to be fully exposed.

The FRETILIN was stronger than ever, he said. Its forces operated in two thirds of the mountain region. Yet, Indonesian authorities and their Western friends said the resistance forces were reduced to a "few hundred bandits". They posed no threat to the Indonesians and, therefore, independence was out of the question.

The Indonesian side would deny everything, as it had done in the past, he said. The United Nations should send a fact-finding mission to the Territory with a specific mandate. As long as the Indonesian side refused to comply fully with Security Council resolutions 384 (1975) and 389 (1976), any fact-finding mission to the Territory would suffer the same restrictions as previous visits. However, the Special Committee on decolonization, in fulfilling its programme of action as mandated by the General Assembly, should seek a visit to the Territory.

If such a fact-finding mission were to take place, he went on, a number of elements would have to be kept in mind: there should be no time limit for the duration of the visit and it should not be less than four weeks. There should be a large delegation that could be divided to cover different areas of the country. Each group should be escorted by non-Indonesian interpreters, who could master both Portuguese and one of the local languages. The delegation's mandate would be one of gathering information on conditions in the Territory and to prepare the ground for a genuine act of self-determination under United Nations supervision.

Report of Sub-Committee

The Committee then interrupted its hearings on East Timor to take action on the report of its Sub-Committee on Petitions, Information and Assistance concerning implementation by the specialized agencies of the Declaration on decolonization (document A/AC.109/L.1593 and Corr.1).

The report concerns conclusions and recommendations reached after consideration of the implementation of the General Assembly's 1960 Declaration on decolonization.

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In this report, the Sub-Committee would have the Special Committee condemn the extensive links and collaboration between South Africa and certain Western countries, especially the United States and Israel, and reiterate the view that all specialized agencies and other organizations and institutions of the United Nations system should take all necessary measures to stop collaboration with, or assistance to, South Africa. The Committee would commend all those agencies and organizations that had terminated relations with South Africa.

Further, the Special Committee would express regret that both the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) continued to maintain links with South Africa. It would, therefore, recommend that the General Assembly, at its forthcoming session, propose the inclusion in the agenda of the IMF Board of Governors of an item dealing with the relationship between the Fund and South Africa.

The Acting Chairman, OSCAR ORAMAS-OLIVA (Cuba), said that the following modification had been made to the report:

In paragraph 6, sub-paragraph 12, the phrase beginning "in this connection" should read "in this connection, the Sub-Committee regrets that the World Bank continues to maintain certain technical and financial links with the racist South African regime." The rest of the phrase reads the same.

The Committee then adopted the report.

ANDERS BJURNER (Sweden) reiterated his reservations regarding paragraph 8 of the report.

There were many differences between the texts of the report and the resolution adopted this morning. It would be appropriate in the future to discuss simultaneously the report and the resolution, he said.

DAVID LOOS, a representative of the World Bank, said he hoped paragraph 12 had been amended in accordance with the corrigendum. The amended resolution and report suggested an understanding of the World Bank's relationship with South Africa.

PATRICIO DAMM (Chile) said he had reservations on paragraph 6, sub-paragraph 1, because countries had been named selectively.

RAJ SINGH (Fiji) said he had reservations since certain countries had been singled out for mention in the report.

MARGARET KING-ROUSSEAU (Trinidad and Tobago) said she had reservations on the same paragraph since certain countries had been selectively condemned.

DJALIA ANVIRE (Côte d'Ivoire) said he would like to repeat the reservations he had made before because of certain formulations.

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Resumption of Question of East Timor

The Committee then resumed its hearings on East Timor.

The next speaker, FLOYD ABRAMS, speaking on behalf of the Asia Watch Committee, said that since 1975, human rights monitors had received reports from East Timor on the killing of non-combatants, extrajudicial executions and torture and detention without trial. It was difficult to confirm all reports as the Indonesian Government maintained a policy of denial of free expression, association or contact with the outside world for East Timorese.

It was important to note that independent human rights organizations had been denied permission by the Indonesian authorities to carry out on-the-spot investigations of the situation in East Timor. Early last month, Asia Watch itself had been denied such permission. Moreover, the Indonesian Government had barred visits by persons with the greatest capacity to assess conditions in East Timor: recognized experts and others who had lived in the Territory at great length prior to the Indonesian invasion.

That visits by such people had not been allowed -- more than 10 years after the Indonesian invasion of the Territory -- spoke eloquently of the Government's desire to hide the situation in East Timor from scrutiny of the international community.

There were few places in the world where outsiders could not visit as tourists. "East Timor is one, and this only adds to the understandably widespread perception that the situation in the Territory is far from the tranquil one the Indonesian authorities maintain it is", he said.

Reports that Asia Watch had received indicated an exceptionally high mortality rate among children between the ages of 1 and 5 in the Baucau region of East Timor, he said, appealing both to the Government and to responsible international organizations to facilitate proper nutritional and medical care for people in need as quickly as possible. He also urged the Indonesian Government to grant full access for agencies seeking to address those problems.

Asia Watch was concerned about the fairness of continuing "subversion trials" in East Timor, he went on. The circumstances surrounding the trials strongly suggested absence of proper procedure. There was strong reason to suspect that prisoners feared retribution for even minimal exercise of their legal rights.

He noted recent reports that the Indonesian Government might make a special attempt to present Timorese participation in 1987 Indonesian national elections as a legitimate expression of Timorese desire to integrate with Indonesia. The Committee, he said, should reject any such inference from the simple act of participation in an election. The results of any election -- even a plebiscite on the future of the Territory -- would not represent a free and fair expression of the will of the people of East Timor. There was the strongest basis for concern about the fairness of any vote held under

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Indonesian Government auspices in 1987, given the atmosphere of fear and coercion that still existed in East Timor and the continuing armed conflict in the Territory, he stated.

JAN MUTER, representing the Komitee Indonesie, said that twice Indonesia, under the leadership of President Suharto, had extended its territory in an expansionist manner and brutally violated international law. In 1969, the so-called "act of free choice" in West Papua was entirely staged by the Indonesian regime. Even the designated United Nations observers could not but declare that there had been no question of a free choice. The recognition by the United Nations of that "act of free choice" and the Indonesian annexation of West Papua might have been prompted by considerations other than international law. After the Indonesian invasion of East Timor in 1975 another arbitrary "act of free choice" was undertaken in 1976. That time, however, such a flagrant violation of international law received no approval in the United Nations.

After a number of years of bloody and heavy fighting, the Indonesian regime resolved to engage a large part of its airforce, he continued. The population, which had fled in their hundreds of thousands to the mountains, was continually harassed by a large quantity of firebombs, which destroyed the harvests and crops. The ensuing famine forced thousands of East Timorese to leave the mountains and place themselves under Indonesian control. From 1979 onwards, over 150,000 East Timorese were forcibly and arbitrarily moved from their birth place and regrouped indiscriminately in 150 Daerah pemukiman. Those "concentration camps", as they are called by the East Timorese people, were intended "to make population control easier and to provide food and medical aid, education and other amenities".

While the East Timorese people were being herded into those camps, where they were subjected to strict military control, and where a policy of creating food shortages was implemented, transmigrants, mostly from Bali, but also from Java, had been flown in since 1982. There was no doubt whatsoever that the purpose and intent of the transmigration programme was military and strategic.

He said the war in East Timor had been characterized by A World at War, 1983, published by the Washington-based Center for Defense Information, as the most bloody war but one, since the Second World War. Conservative estimates of the number of victims since December 1975 were in the order of 200,000. Within that context, the perfect conditions had been created for the Indonesian regime to carry out an all-encompassing and unequalled birth control programme. It had been reported that the pill was massively given out, without any information on what it was used for, and there was no information whatsoever on family planning. There was also a massive use of injectable hormone methods in 31.7 per cent of the women covered by the programme, but they were not informed about the purpose of the "injection" and experiments had been carried out with new contraceptive methods, but the users were not told what was done and they were thus used as involuntary guinea pigs. Finally, there was involuntary sterilization of men and women when they were sent to the hospital.

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In order to throw some light on the real purpose of the family-planning programme in East Timor, he said it was illustrative to compare the birth control programme with the attention given to health care. At the moment there were no less than 250 centres for birth control, which amounted to one centre for 325 fertile couples. The highest figure ever given for "health centres" was 129, and that usually meant poor hovels, abandoned by the medical staff. Moreover, available medical facilities were scarce and extensively used for wounded Indonesian soldiers. From those facts, no other conclusion could be drawn than that an ethnocide was being systematically perpetrated. To complete the picutre, the World Bank was paying all the expenses for that pre-meditated calamity, he concluded.

ROBERT ARCHER, of the Catholic Institute for International Relations, said the Catholic Church in East Timor deplored the cruelty of the violence, and the abuses of human rights which had been taking place. It had criticized the effects of the Indonesian Government's counter-insurgency policies, under which whole communities had been moved from their homes into villages under army surveillance. It had drawn attention to abuses in the Administration's economic and social policies.

The Catholic Church had also warned against too simple an interpretation of the Administration's economic development policies, he went on. It was feared that the economic policies currently implemented by the Indonesian Government did not benefit the people who depended on the land, who were the poorest and most deprived. Finally, the Church had criticized the erosion of Timorese culture and identity as the result of attempts to "Indonesianise" East Timor.

Fear and mistrust had come to govern the lives of the population, who for 10 years had been virtually isolated from the world and, within Timor itself, had been unable to travel at will, or engage in normal economic activity, trust one another or speak freely, he said. While the international community acknowledged there was resistance and opposition to Indonesia's rule, political support for self-determination and for returning the Territory to the pre-1975 position had steadily declined. There was a visible gap between the international principles of diplomacy and its practice. The international community was in a position to shelve the matter of East Timor -- a small Territory, from which the Indonesian Government could not easily be dislodged -- or confront the issues and seek to resolve them justly.

During the years the Institute had worked on the question it had met a number of East Timorese and clergy working in the Territory. While all of them believed that opposition was stronger than before, they did not agree about the form of regime they would like to see replacing the present one. They were unanimous only in their conviction that the invasion of 1975 had been deeply resented, that its effects had traumatized the society and that Indonesia's presence today was even less acceptable to the people than it was in 1975 -- even if it had to be accepted because of force, he said.

Lord ERIC AVEBURY, Chairman of the United Kingdom Parliamentary Human Rights Group, said the General Assembly, in its resolution of November 1982, had called on the Secretary-General "to initiate consultations with all

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parties directly concerned with a view to exploring avenues for achieving a comprehensive settlement of the problem". In light of that, he was submitting to the Committee a declaration which had been signed by several hundred parliamentarians from 14 countries, emphasizing the need to consult the East Timorese people themselves as an essential part of that process.

He had recently exchanged messages with the military commander of FRETILIN, which indicated he would be willing to meet with the Secretary-General. That message had been transmitted to the Secretary-General. Unfortunately, no response had been received to that initiative. Since then, however, FRETILIN and UDT, another East Timor nationalist movement, had joined forces to campaign internationally for the right of self-determination, so that now the consultations would be with a group as widely representative of the people as one could imagine. He hoped, therefore, that the Secretary-General would not continue to hold discussions exclusively with Indonesia and Portugal. That, of course, was totally unacceptable, as could be seen by thinking of some parallel instances. Should the future of Namibia be decided by negotiations with South Africa, the occupying Power and Germany, the former colonial Power? he asked. The Committee should clarify the matter and ensure that the phrase "all parties directly concerned" is taken to include the people themselves.

The Committee should also reaffirm the illegality of the elections held in 1982 and those scheduled for next year, he said. In the longer term, the world would be the loser if the structure of rules for the conduct of international affairs, and particularly those concerning self-determination, were torn up with the consent of the very organization which created them. It would be doubly perilous if the lesson were to be drawn that a large and powerful State could always prevail in an argument with small neighbours, whatever the United Nations might say.

He appealed to the Committee that it uphold the rule of law and the rights of a small people to walk the same road to freedom as almost every other former colony.

MICHEL ROBERT, representing the Association of Solidarity with East Timor, said Indonesia had violated international law by invading East Timor. The fact that the western part of the island had been under Indonesian control for so long could perhaps explain why the international community had not reacted more strongly to the invasion at the time, he said.

The United Nations had not sanctioned the violations of international law and Indonesia could thus claim that there had been no negative reaction from the international community, he continued. Indonesia used United Nations resolutions to argue that there had been self-determination in East Timor. However, he said, integration with Indonesia should result from the free will of the people and not from a military invasion.

He said the seeds of Indonesian integration were violations of human rights and the abuse of international law. The people of East Timor were still to be found concentrated in strategic villages and no longer grew its own foodstuffs -- which explained the famine that occurred occasionally.

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Houses were watched, and the Indonesian Government controlled the island mainly through military means, he said. In addition, Indonesian soldiers, 20,000 in number, spied on innocent people, he said.

Expressing grave concern, he called on the international community to react, and stated that the situation in East Timor must be put to an end.

MASAKI YOKOYAMA, of the Asian Ecumenical Youth Movement, said the first major event the Youth Movement organized when the East Timor issue was presented was the Asian Youth Assembly in Delhi, India in October 1984. Mimi Ferreira, as an East Timorese speaker, was invited and the Assembly adopted a resolution expressing "solidarity with the Church and the people of East Timor in their struggle for peace and justice". However, the planning committee member from Indonesia, after finding out that the East Timor issue was to be raised, boycotted the Assembly. There were more than 10 participants from Indonesia at the Assembly. Some members of the Indonesian delegation persisted in taking close-up photographs of Ms. Ferreira, making inquiries about her flight route and flight number and passport details and at the time of adoption of the resolution on East Timor, the Indonesian delegation blackmailed the rest of the Assembly by threatening to walk out.

He was more and more convinced that the East Timor issue was an Asian issue. It was linked with the democratization of the whole of Asia, and especially of Indonesian society. As long as the military dictatorship controlled the country, the Government would keep its people uninformed or misinformed and control them to act against their smaller neighbours. When Indonesia became a more democratic country, the Indonesian people would come to know more about the situation in East Timor. It would then become very hard for the Government to keep waging war against the East Timorese people, because it clearly violated the universally recognized rights of people for self-determination and basic human rights.

As in the case of the Philippines, no dictatorship lasted forever and a coalition of different forces, with the wide support of the people, could bring a major change, he said. There had been wide international support for the anti-Marcos dictatorship movements in the Philippines and, as a result, a lot of information flowed between the Philippines and other countries. Such a flow of information helped create the conditions for the political change in Manila.

He said that in the Philippines, Hong Kong, Japan, India and elsewhere a network of support for the self-determination of the East Timorese people was already active. People had been exposed to the issue and were much concerned. In fact, the East Timor issue had become one of the most important issues in Asia, along with the militarization and the nuclearization of the Asia-Pacific region, industrial hazards and pollution caused chiefly by transnational corporations and oppression of the minorities in many countries.

MATTHEW FRANCIS, speaking on behalf of the Hobart East Timor Committee, said Portugal had been criticized both for its failure to promote Timorese economic opportunities and initiatives and for its failure to carry out a progress of orderly decolonization. It was also important, he said, to note that, under the Portuguese Administration, virtually all Timorese owned their own homes and land as well as their own livestock, furniture and household utensils. To see an East Timorese poorly clothed or suffering from malnutrition had been extremely rare and destitution had been virtually unknown.

The Portuguese Constitution, he said, committed the Portuguese Government to uphold the rights of the East Timorese people to independence. Though their efforts had not been particularly vigorous, he stressed that the failure of the Portuguese Government to achieve a just, negotiated solution owed more to the apathy and the hypocrisy of a number of nations including Australia. If the United Nations chose to ignore Indonesia's occupation of East Timor, whilst calling on South Africa to withdraw from Namibia, it laid itself open to justified criticism. The East Timorese, like the Namibians, had the right to live free of foreign occupation.

When Indonesia's economic problems no longer permitted the disproportionate spending on the armed forces, political movements which had been driven "underground" would resurface vigorously. The pattern of human rights abuses in both East Timor and Indonesia was closely linked to the belief that political development and the awareness of differing cultural and national identities must be suppressed, he said.

He went on to say that the Australian Government recently had announced the granting of $24 million in aid to West Timor mainly for the development of water supplies. In the last 10 years, Australia had provided only $9 million in aid to East Timor. Implicit in that comparison was the assumption that, even after 10 years of war and dislocation, East Timor remained more prosperous than West Timor. In human terms, however, East Timor was a tragedy of massive proportions.

To fulfil its obligations, the United Nations must consistently press for an Indonesian withdrawal, he said. After that, two positions could be adopted -- an interim Portuguese administration or an interim United Nations administration. Either administration must be short term with its duties being to assist the East Timorese to return to their land, rejoin their families, seek those listed as "disappeared", provide medical help to those who have been tortured, assist in the return of East Timorese held in Indonesian jails and oversee the orderly departure of Indonesian troops and colonists. In the case of a United Nations administration, he urged that under no circumstances should Indonesia be permitted to share in the administration.

ELIZABETH G. TRAUBE, of Wesleyan University, said that as an anthropologist who spent two years in East Timor, she wished to speak to the question of the abilities of the East Timorese to determine their political future.

The pre-colonial political situation on East Timor was one of small, self-governing, agrarian communities, and political integration did not go beyond the community level, she said. Family resemblances among the cultural traditions of those communities both reflected and facilitated communication across ethnic boundaries. But, while the pre-colonial communities might have had an awareness of their broadly shared culture, the foundations for a sense of political unity were laid over the course of the colonial period.

Under colonial rule, she went on, the indigenous peoples came to view their similarities to one another, in contrast to their differences from the European rulers. Although the various ethnic groups of East Timor preserved traditions of their particular origins, all those groups identified themselves in opposition to the Portuguese, and they came to collectively refer to themselves in that context as "Timorese".

For most of the colonial period, however, that heightened sense of cultural unity did not receive political expression, she said. Although individual groups offered intermittent resistance to the Portuguese throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the specific problem of nationalism did not arise. In a cultural milieu where even indigenous chiefs were regarded as outsiders or "stranger-kings", the classification of the Portuguese as overseas foreigners facilitated the legitimation of colonial rule. As late as 1974, most Timorese continued to conceive of the Portuguese as their legitimate sovereign. The group that she lived with and studied on Timor were known as the Mambai. The Portuguese, as Mambai conceived of them, were both outsiders and insiders, and most important, their establishment of political control was understood as the fulfilment of an obligation to the elder people of the land.

It must be said that their initial responses in the wake of the April Revolution were hardly those of model nationalists, she continued. When the possibility of independence was first openly articulated, many Mambai used their mythology to reject that possibility outright. Portuguese rule, it was argued, was part of a necessary order of things. That feeling, however, soon gave rise to concerned, thoughtful, and remarkably sophisticated reflection on the political future. Indeed, Mambai had long been dissatisfied with the prevailing political conditions.

Few of the Mambai had decisively committed themselves to any of the three newly formed political parties, she said. Yet, in the last months before her departure, the Mambai called with increasing urgency for a great reunion, at which representatives from all the ethnic groups of the province, from the new political parties, and from the colonial administration would collectively decide on a proper course of action. Although the phrase was still foreign to them, what Mambai advocated in their own cultural idioms was an authentic process of self-determination. Mambai had not yet endorsed the nationalist programme articulated by FRETILIN, but they had, however, implicitly embraced a fundamental nationalist principle.

That incipient nationalist sentiment defined the local moral-political context for evaluating the legitimacy of the Indonesian annexation, she said.

In December of 1975, a nationalist principle was violated and that violation was felt as such by the indigenous peoples. It should be repeatedly and strongly condemned by the international community.

BILL FELICE of the International League for the Rights and Liberation of Peoples said that over 10 years of war had resulted in the deaths of between 100,000 and 200,000 Timorese, approximately a quarter of the population. Indonesia had carried out brutal counterinsurgency operations and entire populations in a number of villages had been uprooted and moved to camps.

According to Amnesty International, hundreds of non-combatant civilians had been arbitrarily killed since the invasion. Prisoners had "disappeared" after arrest and after being taken from detention centres and prisons and prisoners in the custody of Indonesian troops had been tortured.

Reviewing other violations of human rights and international law, he said numerous attempts by the international community had been undertaken -- calling upon Indonesia to withdraw its invading troops.

The General Assembly had called upon Indonesia "to desist from further violation of the territorial integrity of Portuguese Timor and to withdraw without delay its armed forces from the territory". It had adopted resolutions every year rejecting the claim that East Timor had been integrated into Indonesia and stating that the people of the territory had not been able to exercise their right to self-determination.

Indonesia was violating the rights of the people of East Timor to exist as a people, he continued. In all negotiations, the legitimate representatives of the people of East Timor -- the FRETILIN -- must be represented. If elections were to be held they must be truly democratic involving all parties, he said, calling on the Special Committee on decolonization to take the lead in the international community and act with great boldness to remedy the situation.

FRANCISCO FERNANDES, speaking on behalf of East Timorese refugees living in Australia, said that many East Timorese who left East Timor during the short civil war in August 1975 would have returned were it not for the illegal and unjustifiable Indonesian invasion in December 1975. Since that invasion, many more East Timorese had fled the country. Few have wanted to return, even if that were possible. While some East Timorese had gained their exit from the war-torn country through intergovernmental agreements or through the International Red Cross, a great number had to leave through the subterfuge of false identities and payments to corrupt Indonesian army officers. Such conditions of departure from East Timor persisted to this day.

He said that the Government of Indonesia claimed that East Timor had been opened up to foreign journalists and diplomats, but many East Timorese had seen the preparations that went on before the visits of foreign dignitaries to East Timor, such as the arrest or removal of people who might contact visitors and give them the true story, and the relocation of Indonesian army units so that they were out of sight of the visitors. There were few opportunities for visitors from outside to determine the knowledge, views, fears and aspirations of ordinary East Timorese.

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The East Timorese felt they were in danger of extinction, he said. They believe that some 200,000 East Timorese died since the invasion of East Timor. East Timorese had every reason to believe that the Government of Indonesia -- after killing so many and then conducting forcible birth control programmes -- was commited to a genocide of the Timorese people.

The experience of East Timorese under Indonesian occupation and the fear that they were in danger of extinction, meant that they could not trust the Indonesian Government to represent or serve their best interests. The experience meant that the East Timorese had to continue to fight and to say "no" to the annexation. East Timorese were not anti-Indonesian, but they remained opposed to the arrogant use of military power by the Indonesian Government to achieve its political aims.

He said that any East Timorese appearing at an international discussion on East Timor was aware that he might be putting in danger any surviving relatives still inside East Timor. So, his appearance was done with great reluctance and fear, but driven by the deepest hope that the United Nations would be persuaded to keep the issue on its agenda. All East Timorese were aware that the Government of Indonesia had rejected successive United Nations General Assembly and Security Council resolutions calling on Jakarta to respect the right of the East Timorese to self-determination. Of greater concern had been the increasing numbers of Governments which had since 1975, decided to vote with Indonesia on the issue or abstain from voting. Such decisions by Member States, commited to the United Nations Charter, were a continuing source of bitterness for the East Timorese.

There was no just reason for declining support at the United Nations for the right to self-determination, he added. A genuine, internationally supervised act of self-determination, in the absence of armed coercion, was the only way to resolve the question about East Timor's future. The United Nations still offered a means of achieving a just solution for a small and isolated people. Member States of the United Nations not only had the right, but they had the responsibility to ensure that all those means were properly pursued.

ELAINE BRIERE, representing the Canada Asia Working Group, said the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Timorese during the Indonesian occupation was common knowledge. Continued reports of mass arrests, disappearances, torture and murder; the forced resettlement and lack of freedom of movement; the appropriation of Timorese ancestral lands; the transmigration of Indonesians onto those lands; the religious persecution; the forced sterilization of Timorese women; the use of a school system to impose the Indonesian state philosphy Panacila; and the stated objective of Indonesia to absorb ethnic groups into the Indoensian culture, were the overwhelming evidene of a dehumanized disregard for individual human rights.

No argument could justify the continuation of Indonesian occupation of East Timor. In light of the agenda of ethnocide which Indonesia's actions illustrate, any attempt by Indonesia to justify remaining in East Timor was an affront to human dignity.

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The Indonesian Government should be pressed to honour its promises to allow independent observers to visit East Timor and observe conditions first hand. Pressure should be applied on Indonesian authorities to give free and unrestricted access to international relief and human rights groups to work in East Timor, particularly the International Committee of the Red Cross and Amnesty International.

She added that Indonesia should be pressed to agree to a resumption of the 1983 cease-fire and consider proposals for a solution to the conflict put forward by the FRETILIN. All measures should be taken to ensure the withdrawal of Indonesian troops, and to ensure an internationally supervised referendum on self-determination in East Timor. FRETILIN representatives should be included in all discussions or negotiations relating to the future of the Timorese people.

LUISA TEOTONIO PEREIRA of the Committee for the Rights of the East Timorean people, said that through the invasion of East Timor, Indonesia had violated two principles of international law. It had not only stood in the way of self-determination but had also carried out an act of aggression against East Timor.

The people of East Timor had been denied their basic human rights, among which was the principle to decide their own future, she said. The situation was still disregarding the will of the people. Not even the Indonesian administration could deny the existence of the war and the thousands of soldiers who had died in East Timor, she said.

The solution, she continued, had to be attained through peaceful means. The representatives of the people of East Timor had a right to participate in the discussions concerning their future. The people were now living as within a prison in the Territory where they had been born.

Portugal understood colonialism fully, based on its historic experience. It believed in the right of each people to make its own decisions, she said, expressing support to the people of East Timor.

MARTINHO DA COSTA LOPES, apostolic administrator of the Roman Catholic Church in East Timor (1977-1983), said since he left East Timor in 1983, his knowledge of the sitution had been based on steady communication with trusted correspondents, who confirmed that there had been little change in the oppression or conditions under which most East Timorese must live. The need for a solution to the tragedy in East Timor was as strong as ever.

He said that difficult as the situation might now appear, the conflict in East Timor could only be resolved by political and diplomatic means, not through military action. Only a genuine and completely free act of self-determination, supervised by expert and impartial United Nations observers, would bring a just and lasting peace to East Timor. And as long as freedom and justice were denied, the conflict would go on and on.

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It had been said that the East Timorese people had already recognized their right to self-determination in 1976, when members of the "East Timor People's Assembly" requested integration with Indonesia. Such a statement should be rejected not only as irresponsible but also as false. It was no secret that the delegates of the "Popular Assembly" were not democratically elected by the East Timorese people, but were appointed by the Indonesians themselves.

Some also said that the people of East Timor had shown their will to integrate with Indonesia "by participating freely, fully and equally in all respects in the national elections of Indonesia in 1982". That argument did not stand up to close scrutiny, since, for voting to have any meaning, people must have a free choice as well as an atmosphere free of coercion and since 1975 until now, the vast majority of the East Timorese people had been living in the midst of violence, fighting and insecurity.

What actually happened in East Timor during the so-called election of 1982? she asked. Indonesian military officials instructed people to vote in the booth of the government party, while many East Timorese people were approached at night by officials and told how to vote. It was rumored that in its 1987 national legislative elections, Jakarta would try to carry out a similar "vote". The United Nations should not unwisely allow itself to become a participant in such an unjust political manouevre, he said.

It was with great sadness that he noted that some countries, although they had approved the principles of the United Nations Charter, still were reluctant -- perhaps for political or commercial reasons -- to recognize East Timor's right to self-determination. Such countries were willing to sacrifice the rights and well-being of East Timor in exchange for Indonesian oil, money, contracts and other material commodities. No one -- no Government, international institution or individual -- with real moral fiber could approve of such actions.

He said that when some countries of the world, through their representatives at the United Nations, for one reason or another, voted against or abstained on the question of East Timor's inalienable right to self-determination, those nations contributed not only to the deaths of many tens of thousands of East Timorese men, women and children, but also contributed to an increase in the suffering and deaths of more and more East Timorese people. Finally, he emphasized, East Timor's right to self-determination was not negotiable.

Having concluded hearings on the item, the Acting Chairman, Mr. ORAMAS-OLIVA (Cuba), gave the floor to ANDERS BJURNER (Sweden), who said he wished to reaffirm his Government's strong support for the principle of self-determination. His Government had not changed its opinion tht East Timor had not yet exercised its right to self-determination. He would give whole-hearted support to the Secretary-General in his attempt to solve the tragic problem of East Timor.

S. WIRYONO (Indonesia) said that while responding to the statements only would lend dignity to them, the endless repetition of such ludicrous charges could not be allowed to pass unanswered. One theme that had been propounded by the representatives of Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe, Mozambique and Angola was that the right to self-determination had not been granted to the people of East Timor. It was time for them to comprehend the fact that it was a decade ago that self-determination and decolonization had taken place in East Timor in conformity with resolution 1514 (XV) and principles VI, VIII and IX of resolution 1541; that in accordance with their traditional democratic practices, the overwhelming majority of the East Timorese people had chosen independence through integration with the Republic of Indonesia.

Indonesia's role in East Timor had been one of contributing to the process of decolonization, he said. The historical record showed that the policy of Indonesia had been to support the Portuguese efforts to decolonize the Territory. Indonesia had consistently maintained that it had no territorial claim on East Timor, that it would respect any decision made by the people of East Timor and had only sought assurances from Portugal that the process of decolonization and the act of self-determination would reflect the true aspirations and will of the East Timorese people.

Of the five political parties in East Timor at the time, FRETILIN had been the only one which persistently had refused to co-operate in a peaceful and orderly decolonization of the Territory. It had boycotted the Macao meeting of June 1975, organized by Portugal and attended by the four other political parties. Thus, it had been FRETILIN's actions to circumvent democratic procedures that had plunged the Territory into a violent confrontation between the people and FRETILIN.

The colonial administration in Dili had made no serious effort to stop the bloodshed and the political chaos. It had abandoned the Territory at the height of the civil war and by October 1975, may thousands had lost their lives in the civil war. Despite that deplorable train of events, Indonesia had continued to urge Portugal to ensure a just and orderly decolonization.

After Portugal's abandonment of the Territory, the other four political parties had begun their struggle against the FRETILIN forces and had proclaimed the independence of East Timor through integration with Indonesia. It had been then, with no action taken by anyone to stop the mass killings and atrocities perpetrated by FRETILIN against the East Timorese people, that Indonesia had become inexorably involved in the East Timor crisis.

The decision of the people of East Timor had been confirmed and reconfirmed, particularly during the May 1982 general elections when the East Timorese freely had participated in the national vote with a 90 per cent voter turnout. The East Timorese people's decision to integrate with Indonesia also constituted a definitive rejection of FRETILIN, a minority group which had sought to impose its own designs on the Territory. It was the ultimate insult to the entire Indonesian nation to compare, as cerain petitioners had attempted to do, those adventurers and pseudo-revolutionaries to Indonesia's freedom-fighters.

Indonesia, he continued, had kept the Committee fully informed on the encouraging progress being made in the development efforts in East Timor. On

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many occasions in the past it had presented findings of representatives of international humanitarian and developmental organizations operating in East Timor. All of them had only praise for the progress being made in overcoming the backwardness and neglect that characterized the 450 years of colonial rule, he said.

Reviewing the visit by Father Rudiger Seifert, a Catholic priest of the Dominican order in the Federal Republic of Germany, of East Timor, he said Father Seifert had reported no malnutrition in the villages on the main island or on Atauro; no religious persecution or restrictions on the full range of activities beig carried out by the Catholic Church.

He had also emphasized that while under the former Portuguese administration the illiteracy rate in East Timor had been one of the highest in the world, the situation had dramatically improved. In the health sector, he had reported that while in 1973 the Dili General Hospital was very small and technically underdeveloped, today it had been greatly expanded and provided with all the necessary wards, proper technical equipment and medicaments. Father Siefert had also underscored that the apportioned budget for East Timor was higher per capita than any other province, which was confirmed by the hierarchy of the Catholic Church.

He regretted that despite repeated corroborations of the factual security situation, the myth continued to be perpetuated as if there continued to be large-scale military operations in East Timor and a large Indonesian military presence on the island. In that context, a representative of Mozambique seemed to have been a bit over zealous in his figures. The total strength of Indonesia's armed forces was less than 300,000 spread over 6,000 inhabited islands. In conclusion, he urged members of the Committee to consider the social and economic realities of East Timor.

ANTONIO MONTEIRO (Portugal) said he had already stressed the contributions the Special Committee had made to ensuring peoples' right to self-determination. He strongly supported the right of any people to select their own destiny. He stressed the importance he attached to the work of the Committee in ensuring that right to self-determination and respect for fundamental freedoms.

He supported the work of the Secretary-General regarding East Timor. Taking into account the importance of the Secretary-General's report, he was sure the Committee would understand if he withheld any further comments on the item.

The Committee then decided to continue its consideration of the item at its next session.

Question of Gibraltar

With regard to its item on the question of Gibraltar, the Committee decided to continue consideration of the question at its next session, subject to any directives of the General Assembly, and so as to facilitate the

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consideration of the item by the Fourth Committee (Decolonization), to transmit to the Assembly all related documentation.

Closing Statement

The Acting Chairman, Mr. ORAMAS-OLIVA (Cuba), in a closing statement, said the Committee had supplied a breath of hope to those who still struggled for self-determination. No one had the right to trample on the right to self-determination. The Committee had witnessed that struggle. It was an irreversible process. It was a shame that at the end of the twentieth century there still existed in the world colonialism, racism and apartheid.

He said in many Territories there had been no progress. That was particularly true of Namibia. In a decision adopted by the Committee, the situation had been looked at in some detail. The only solution was the complete end to the occupation of Namibia and the Committee had reiterated the requirement for adherence to Security Council resolution 435, and had rejected the attempt to link the end of the occupation with extraneous issues, such as the internal situation in Angola. It was incumbent upon the permanent members of the Security Council to enact binding sanctions against South Africa.

As for foreign economic and other interests, the Committee had made a series of important recommendations, he said. No foreign interest should hinder in any way the implementation of the Declaration on decolonization in the Territories. The Special Committee had, in the past, always enjoyed the co-operation of administering Powers.

It was disquieting then, he said, that the United Kingdom had decided not to participate in the work of the Committee, particularly since 10 of the 18 Territories were still administered by the United Kingdom. He hoped the United Kingdom would respond to the appeal of the Committee and he hoped that, in the future, the Committee would have the co-operation of all the administering authorities.

In a few days, he said, a summit of the non-aligned would be held in Zimbabwe. It should serve as an inspiration for those who still fought for their freedom in Namibia.

The Committee should unite in its commitment to push forward to its conclusion the resolution that created the Committee so that all men might walk in freedom.

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